Ideological Incongruence and Electoral Campaigns

Abstract

Preferential voting systems encourage candidates to build a personal reputation. However, within the same system, some candidates are more likely than others to adopt personalistic or partisan campaigns. We argue that candidates' ideological distance from their party is key to understanding such a decision. Ideologically incongruent candidates are less likely to help their parties win office in concurrent elections and are less likely to emphasize their parties' platforms when campaigning. Using original data on candidate endorsements in Brazil, where federal and state elections are held simultaneously, we show that ideologically incongruent federal-level candidates are more likely to endorse cross-partisan candidates. Furthermore, using cross-national data from five European countries, we demonstrate that ideologically incongruent candidates emphasize their parties' platforms less than those ideologically aligned with their parties. This paper broadens our understanding of campaigns by showing that individual characteristics contribute to explaining variations in behavior within the same electoral system.

Electoral rules influence politicians' behavior. In systems that allow for intraparty competition, candidates are encouraged to build a personal reputation to win office (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Crisp, Cunha Silva, Olivella, & Rosas, 2025; Renwick, 2016). Candidates competing under preferential voting rules often draw more attention to themselves and spend more time campaigning (Sudulich & Trumm, 2019). Weak candidate nomination rules appear to stimulate a similar behavior, with politicians behaving in a more personalistic manner and emphasizing less their parties (Crisp & Ingall, 2002; Motolinia, 2021; Samuels, 1999). Nevertheless, electoral rules and nomination procedures cannot wholly explain the behavior of candidates. Otherwise, we would not observe variation in campaign behavior within a system. Indeed, candidates competing under the same rules do opt for different campaign strategies, with some drawing more attention to their parties' reputations and platforms to secure office. In contrast, others decide to emphasize their own ideas and reputation.

We hypothesize that ideological incongruence can help explain such variation in behavior. More precisely, we argue that candidates are significantly less likely to focus on their shared party's reputation when their ideological alignment with their party is weaker. Similar to voting against the party line in the legislature (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Giannetti & Laver, 2008), by opting out of a party-centered campaign, candidates can express their disagreement with their parties. As a result, ideologically incongruent politicians are least likely to act as party agents during campaigns. Consequently, when competing against co-partisans, these candidates are less likely to draw attention to their parties' political platforms. Such ideological hostility toward their parties might even extend to party members against whom the ideologically incongruent candidate is not competing against. Specifically, these candidates will be less likely to help their co-partisans in concurrent elections during campaigns.

We evaluate this argument using two studies. In our first study, we employ original data from endorsements in Brazilian legislative elections. We collected endorsements from federal legislative candidates to state deputy candidates during the 2018 general election.

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In this study, we evaluate our argument in an environment characterized by high levels of intraparty competition (Cheibub & Sin, 2020) and present novel evidence showing that Brazilian politicians are more likely to cross party lines and support cross-party candidates during campaigns when they are not ideologically closely aligned with their own parties.

Although we find evidence supporting our argument in this first study, Brazilian parties are known for being electorally weak (Klašnja & Titiunik, 2017; Mainwaring, 1999; Novaes, 2018). One could argue that the type of party found in Brazil might explain ideological incongruence, with parties recruiting ideologically incongruent candidates and allowing them to behave in a way that boosts the party's electoral support. To address this concern, we use secondary analysis to evaluate whether party type influences ideological incongruence and to improve the generalizability of our findings. In this second study, we analyze data from five European countries from the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) (Lutz et al., 2018) combined with data on party characteristics from V-Party (Lindberg et al., 2022). This study again supports our claim that ideological incongruence is negatively related to the likelihood of candidates employing party-centered strategies in their campaigns. As predicted, politicians who are ideologically incongruent with their parties are more likely to focus on issues specific to their own campaigns rather than those from their parties' platforms. Additionally, we find no evidence that party type is linked to candidate ideological incongruence. Consequently, the type of party does not drive our results. In summary, the findings from our two studies indicate that ideologically incongruent politicians are more likely to act as mavericks than as party agents during campaigns.

By demonstrating that partisans' ideological positions influence their behaviors during campaigns, this paper suggests both positive and negative consequences for ideologically diverse parties. On the one hand, these parties can "cast a wide net" by blurring their political message, which increases the likelihood of attracting ideologically diverse (or non-ideological) voters (Somer-Topcu & Tavits, 2023). Moreover, these parties could be more successful at attracting party-switchers, which can be vital for office-seeking parties in the

period between elections. On the other hand, these parties may struggle to communicate their platforms effectively to core and strong ideological voters, weakening their party label, which could have consequential impacts (Lupu, 2017). Additionally, including ideologically incongruent candidates might lead to a party delegation that also reflects diverse ideologies, requiring leadership to tightly control backbenchers to protect the party's reputation (Proksch & Slapin, 2012). As a result, there is a trade-off in selecting maverick candidates that parties must consider.

Electoral Campaigns in Preferential Voting Systems

Where voters cast a ballot at the party level and elites control the nomination process, candidates primarily depend on their parties' performances to gain office, and politicians should rely more on the party label during campaigns. Conversely, candidate-centered campaigns are most effective in places where candidates rely primarily on their own efforts to win office. More precisely, when either voters or candidates themselves are responsible for access to the ballot and voters cast preferential votes, candidates are encouraged to differentiate themselves from co-partisans to secure office (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Crisp, Escobar-Lemmon, Jones, Jones, & Taylor-Robinson, 2004; Farrell & Scully, 2007; Renwick, 2016).

Scholars have found evidence that preferential voting systems and nomination procedures influence the likelihood of candidates opting for more candidate-centered campaigns. Sudulich and Trumm (2019) show that candidates draw more attention to themselves, spend more time campaigning, and use a greater variety of resources in preferential voting systems. These candidates also spend more time in their constituencies when competing in such systems (André & Depauw, 2014). In terms of nomination procedures, evidence from Colombia, before the 2003 reform when the country still employed a closed-list proportional system with pooling at the sub-party level, suggests that parties' limited control over nominations contributed to the prevalence of campaigns centered on personal reputations in that country

(Cox & Shugart, 1995; Crisp & Ingall, 2002). Likewise, the party's control over nominations explains why Brazilian Workers' Party candidates—often considered the only large programmatic party in the country (Klašnja & Titiunik, 2017; Mainwaring, 1999)—are more likely to opt for a party-centered campaign than candidates from other parties (Samuels, 1999). In Mexico, once reelection became possible, reducing party leaders' control over nomination, legislators increased the share of particularistic legislation in their portfolios to boost their personal reputations and electoral chances (Motolinia, 2021). Using data from 101 parties across 16 democracies, Tuttnauer and Rahat (2025) demonstrates that candidates chosen through primary-based methods are more likely to exploit their personal reputation during their campaigns, even when running under party-centered electoral systems, such as closed-list proportional representation.[1]

Undoubtedly, electoral rules and nomination procedures play an essential role in shaping candidates' behavior. Nevertheless, even holding electoral rules constant, variations in campaign strategy remain considerable. Figure 1 shows the distribution of the differences in candidates' responses to questions on how much they emphasize their own issues and issues in the party platform during their campaigns, where higher values represent more emphasis on their own issues. The Figure displays boxplots for each party in Estonia, Greece, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland, all countries that utilize preferential vote systems. Specifically, Estonia and Greece use open-list proportional representation, in which voters can cast a ballot for a specific candidate and the list is automatically reordered based on voters' preferences after the election. Norway and Sweden utilize a flexible-list proportional representation, in which voters have the opportunity to cast a preferential ballot. However, the candidate list is only reordered once a candidate surpasses a pre-established vote threshold.[2] Finally, Switzerland uses a free-list proportional representation in which voters have as many (preferential)

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[1]Interesting, Tuttnauer and Rahat (2025) find that candidates selected via primaries in preferential systems are less likely to campaign in personal terms than those selected by other means.

[2]As noted by Crisp et al. (2025), the threshold that candidates must clear in Norway is very high (at least half of the preference votes cast for members of their party). However, because candidates may campaign for preferential votes to demonstrate their appeal to voters, aiming to improve their list position in the next election, we decided to code Norway as a flexible-list proportional representation system.

votes as seats in dispute and can cast votes across party lines (i.e., *panachage*).

Figure 1: Primary Aim During a Campaign: Emphasis on Own Issues-Emphasis on Party Issues by Party-Country and Electoral System

Note: Candidates running as independent were excluded. Distribution of the difference between the responses for the questions: Emphasis during campaign: Issues specific to own personal, and Emphasis during campaign: Particular items on the party platform. 0 = Same emphasis. Higher values indicate more emphasis on the candidate's own issues. Comparative Candidate Survey Wave 2 (Lutz et al., 2018).

In each panel of Figure 1, the size of the box represents the interquantile range in the variable, the darker horizontal line represents the median value, the vertical lines represent the "minimum" and "maximum values" (largest and smallest values no further than 1.5 × the interquantile range from the first and third quantiles, respectively), and finally, the dots represent outliers. The distribution of candidates' preferences indicates that various campaign strategies are employed within a country. Although the boxplots suggest that, across all five countries, most candidates emphasized their party's issues more, it is clear that there is considerable variation among them. In fact, in several instances, candidates

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competing in the same country and party opt for opposing campaign strategies.

Electoral rules and nomination procedures shape candidates' campaign strategies. However, as shown in Figure 1, there is significant variation within a country that may be due to other factors. We suggest that candidates' ideology affects their choice between a candidate-centered and a party-centered campaign. Specifically, candidates consider the difference between their own and their parties' ideological positions when designing their campaigns. Candidates who are less aligned ideologically with their parties may also be less likely to run a party-centered campaign. The result of this electoral strategy is being less likely to emphasize their parties, to stray from issues in the party platform, and to be less inclined to help other party members win office.

Evidence from the party cohesion literature provides a theoretical basis for the expectation that individual policy positions affect politicians' chances of defecting from their parties during campaigns. Scholars have shown that legislators who diverge from their parties' ideological positions are more likely to vote against the party line (Bernauer & Bräuninger, 2009; Giannetti & Laver, 2008). According to Close and Gherghina (2019), legislators vote against their parties to voice their disagreement with their parties. Furthermore, although such behavior is more common when parties lack strong disciplinary tools (Ceron, 2015), legislators who oppose their parties' position are less disciplined than their colleagues even in contexts of strict party control, such as the House of Commons in Britain (Kam, 2001). Our argument posits that, similar to breaking the party line in the legislature, candidates may opt against a party-centered campaign when they hold an ideological position that differs from their party's.

When deciding on a campaign strategy, candidates may consider their own policy motivations (Callander, 2008; Wittman, 1983). Candidates who share policy preferences with their parties have no reason to deviate from the party platform. They can comfortably exploit their parties' reputations during campaigns. Indeed, because the candidate and party prefer the same set of policies, not emphasizing their party would reduce these candidates'

ability to communicate their political ideas to voters and, more importantly, diminish their chances of building support for their parties' platforms and themselves. Moreover, these candidates are likely loyal party agents who may campaign for and endorse colleagues running in concurrent elections. In contrast, ideologically incongruent candidates are motivated to choose a less party-centered campaign. Focusing on the party label during their campaigns signals support for a platform with which these candidates do not fully agree, leading them to emphasize their individual characteristics and political proposals. Furthermore, they are likely less inclined to support their co-partisans competing in other elections. Consequently, they may be unwilling to assist colleagues they perceive as ideologically distant.

Although we argue that individuals' ideological incongruence with their parties is key to understanding the variation in campaign strategy, an alternative explanation is that party type partially explains candidates' campaign strategies. In this scenario, parties would select specific types of candidates, and the hypothesized behavior would be just a consequence of a strategic decision made by parties. More precisely, two possible reasons might explain why some parties intentionally nominate individuals who do not campaign under the party label and platform. One possibility is that having these candidates can attract a more ideologically diverse pool of voters, helping the party to win seats. However, such candidates will behave as mavericks who prioritize their personal reputation over the party, likely challenging some partisan positions once elected. Consequently, parties need to balance the need for ideologically diverse candidate slates to increase their electoral appeal to (some) voters against the possibility of weakening the party. This trade-off likely occurs even in contexts where vote for individual candidates plays a minor role (Crisp, Olivella, Malecki, & Sher, 2013). Another possible reason is that the nomination of mavericks may help to blur the party's ideological position. A party with a plethora of candidates following personalistic strategies is more likely that its positions will be vague and inconsistent, making party stances significantly more ambiguous to voters (Lefevere, 2024). This ambiguity would be an efficient strategy because it allows parties to be perceived as ideologically closer to a different set of voters

(Somer-Topcu & Tavits, 2023). Even though this argument raises a potential issue for our theory and tests, as we demonstrate below, we have no evidence that party type correlates with candidates' ideological incongruence.

Study 1: Candidate Endorsements in Brazil

We begin our investigation by evaluating the behavior of Brazilian politicians during legislative campaigns. In Brazil, federal and state deputies are elected in concurrent elections using open-list proportional representation, where each of the 26 states and the federal district serves as a single at-large district. In federal-level elections, the district magnitude ranges from 8 to 70, while in state-level elections, it varies from 24 to 94. Although voters can cast either a preferential or a party-level vote (both types of votes are pooled to determine the number of seats won by each party), most voters opt for casting a preferential ballot (Zucco Jr & Nicolau, 2016). Candidates who rank higher in the (party) vote tally are allocated the seats designated to their party.[3] Because of the large district magnitude and the fact that candidates' final positions on the party list depend only on preferential votes, the Brazilian electoral system is considered an extreme case of systems with high personalistic incentives (Cheibub & Sin, 2020).

Due to the concurrence of the same districts and their geographical size, it is common for candidates running for federal deputy to endorse one or more candidates running for state deputy (Samuels, 2001a; Wylie, 2018). Because federal-level candidates and state-level candidates are competing in the same district but for different offices, such a strategy is beneficial for both candidates. Federal candidates who partner with a state-level candidate typically do so to expand their electoral base throughout the district and, often, provide financial resources to state-level candidates (Samuels, 2001b). Endorser and endorsee, then,

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[3]In the 2018 election, from which the data for this analysis comes, parties could run solo or form pre-electoral coalitions (PECs) in these elections. If a party ran as part of a PEC, its votes were pooled with those from other parties in the coalition during the seat allocation process. Since the 2020 municipal elections, pre-electoral coalitions have been banned.

campaign together and usually produce shared campaign materials during the electoral cycle (see examples of ads in SI A). These endorsements are highly desirable to state-level candidates. For instance, of the 903 state deputies interviewed by the *Centro de Estudos Legislativos* (Federal University of Minas Gerais), 866 (95.9%) declared that they received support from a federal-level candidate during their campaign. Furthermore, although there is no study on the effect of endorsements in these elections, campaign manuals from non-governmental organizations highlight the importance of receiving such endorsements (e.g., RAPS, 2020). This suggests that these endorsements are viewed positively by the political actors involved in these elections.[4]

We collected endorsements made by federal incumbents toward candidates for state deputy in the 2018 Brazilian election. We focused on federal incumbents because the number of candidates in those elections (more than seven thousand) precluded data collection from the entire candidate slate.[5] To compute the dependent variable, we obtained all Facebook posts made by federal incumbents (67,131 posts) between the official campaign period (August 16th and October 7th, 2018). We first identified pages for 384 out of 410 incumbents listed in the *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral*'s (TSE) candidacies database—twenty-six incumbents did not have a Facebook page. Then, we used Crowdtangle, a public tool from Facebook that allowed for collecting posts from public pages, to retrieve the posts.[6]

We verified whether incumbents endorsed state-level candidates using regular expressions. To do so, we exploited the fact that, in these elections, state-level candidates are identified

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[4]Note that parties field candidates in both elections. As office-seeking actors, parties likely prefer their federal-level candidates to endorse/partner with a co-partisan running at the state level.

[5]Note that both federal and state-level legislative candidates are nominated during the same statewide party convention, reducing the possibility that different party actors nominate federal and state-level candidates in the same campaign period.

[6]We acknowledge that, ideally, the analysis should include *all* federal candidates. However, there are practical reasons for this decision. First, as we mentioned, there were more than seven thousand federal deputy candidates in the 2018 election. This high number of candidates precludes our ability to collect data for all our variables for all candidates. Second, as explained, most incumbents running for reelection had an online presence (93.6%), which is unlikely to be the case among challengers. As a result, our inferences would be subject to a higher risk of selection bias. Finally, although Brazil has highly personalistic campaigns, the country's legislature is structured around parties (Freitas, 2016). As a result, incumbents should be more likely to be aligned with the party line. Hence, if we find support for our hypothesis, this will likely be a conservative estimation.

by a five-digit number to search for endorsements (for more details on these identification numbers, see Cunha Silva, 2023). We also searched for the expression "(deputad[a|as|o|os] ?estadua[l|is])," which includes variations of the expression "state deputy" in Portuguese.[7] After using the regular expressions, we read each one of the posts to identify the state-level candidate who received the endorsement and to remove potential cases of false positives. Using these strategies, we found that 307 incumbents endorsed at least one state-level candidate.[8] We code the dependent variable, *Co-partisan Endorsement*, as the number of co-partisans endorsed divided by the total number of candidates endorsed by the incumbent. Then, we multiply the resulting number by 100 ($\hat{\mu} = 59.88$, $sd = 35.57$). Large numbers in *Co-partisan Endorsement* indicate that a higher share of endorsements were directed to co-partisan candidates.

We measure the ideological positions of incumbents and parties using the coordinate values from the W-Nominate (Poole, 2005), a widely used scaling technique for roll-call votes (Desposato, 2006a; Rosenthal & Voeten, 2004).[9] We use the two coordinates because recently authors have suggested that the first coordinate represents an economic dimension (left-right), and the second coordinate represents a social dimension (liberal-conservative) (see Bernabel, 2015). With the two coordinates for each legislator in hand, we computed the parties' coordinates using the average score of the party delegation's coordinates.[10] Then, we generated *Ideological Incongruence* as the Euclidean distance in the two-dimensional space between each incumbent and the party for which they ran in the 2018 election ($\hat{\mu} = 0.32$, $sd = 0.24$).[11]

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[7]The expression consists of variations in term of gender "*deputado*" for male candidates and "*deputada*" for female candidates; and of plural/singular: "*deputados estaduais*" for more than one deputy and "*deputado estadual*" for only one deputy.

[8]The sample contains 298 incumbents due to data constraints on independent variables.

[9]The two coordinates were calculated using W-Nominate's default settings. Legislators who voted fewer than 20 times and votes in which the losing side received less than 2.5% of the total were excluded (Poole, 2005). Brazilian legislative data are sourced from the Brazilian Center for Analysis and Planning (CEBRAP).

[10]We show in SI B that our results are robust to an alternative measure that uses the coordinates of the median party member as the party position.

[11]Formally, *Ideological Incongruence* $= \sqrt{(l_1 - p_1)^2 + (l_2 - p_2)^2}$, where l_1 and l_2 are the two coordinates for the legislator, and p_1 and p_2 are the coordinates for the party.

Even though using roll-call votes to calculate ideological incongruence may seem like a limitation—given that roll-call votes are partially a product of party discipline and leadership pressure—there are two reasons why it may still provide a good measure for ideology in this study. First, scholars have demonstrated that ideology measures based on roll-call votes correlate highly with those using other types of data, such as social media and campaign contributions data (Barberá, 2015; Bonica, 2014). For the Brazilian case, Souza, Graça, and Silva (2017) finds that estimates based on roll-call votes are highly correlated with those derived from Twitter data. Second, the tight party control over roll-call votes likely reduces the ideological difference between politicians and their parties. Consequently, a measure based on roll-call votes likely *underestimates* ideological differences, making it harder to detect any meaningful association between the dependent and explanatory variables.[12]

We model the relationship between *Ideological Incongruence* and *Co-partisan Endorsement* using a linear model. Ideally, we would use party-state fixed effects. However, as shown in Figure B.2, 127 out of 182 party-state clusters have only one observation. Consequently, there is not enough within-cluster variation to include this type of fixed effects. Instead, we estimate our model with two-way fixed effects (party and state/district), given that only four out of 23 parties and one out of 27 states included in our analysis have only a single observation.

We include a set of controls in the model to reduce the possibility of spurious association between *Ideological Incongruence* and *Co-partisan Endorsement*. First, we control for candidates' characteristics, such as *Membership in Years*, *Political Experience*, and *Party Leadership*. We reason that candidates who are long-term party members are more likely to opt for party-centered campaigns due to their enduring relationship with the party. Although we do not have a clear expectation regarding *Political Experience*—more experienced

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[12]Because our measure for ideological position uses data from the entire term, and some incumbents switched parties, one may wonder whether our results are driven by these individuals who may have a more extreme value for ideological difference. We take two approaches to deal with this potential issue. First, we control for party switching. Second, in Table B.11 (SI), we show results from models in which we exclude these individuals. The analysis in the SI suggests that these individuals do not drive our results.

candidates may focus on their parties or themselves because they better understand their electorate—we include this covariate to reduce possible omitted variable bias and increase the estimates' precision.[13] Finally, there is a debate in the literature concerning party leaders' behavior. On the one hand, some research argues for a process of increasing personalism of the leader, also known as presidentialization, where power shifts away from groups such as parties and cabinets to the leader (Balmas, Rahat, Sheafer, & Shenhav, 2014; Poguntke & Webb, 2007). On the other hand, Karvonen (2014) indicates mixed evidence of an increase in leaders' personalism across parliamentary systems in Western Europe; parties remain central to voters' evaluations. Similarly, Shugart (2001) claims that the tendency is towards moderation, where countries with high intra-party competition tend to implement reforms to reduce it (and vice versa). Due to Brazil's high levels of party switching (Desposato, 2006b), we also include the variable *Switch* to account for federal deputies who switched parties during their term.

Second, at the party-district level, we add an indicator for whether the incumbents' parties are running as part of a pre-electoral coalition (PEC) (*Party is Running in a PEC*). This variable controls for the fact that incumbents from parties running as part of a PEC may be more likely to support candidates from other parties than incumbents from parties running solo.[14]

Lastly, we also control for the intraparty competition at the district level. As mentioned, candidates are incentivized to differentiate themselves from co-partisans in electoral systems with high intraparty competition. Because this incentive is likely a function of the number of co-partisans running and the party's electoral viability, we utilize the index proposed by Crisp, Schneider, Catalinac, and Muraoka (2021). The index is given by $(C_t/P_{t-1}) \times (E_{t-1}/P_{t-1})$, where C_t is the number of co-partisans running in the district at t (the current election), P_{t-1} is the party magnitude using the results in $t-1$ (the previous election), and

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[13]It is worth noticing that, in the Brazilian case, political experience is significantly different from being a long member of a party (see Cheibub, Moreira, Sin, & Tanabe, 2022; Desposato, 2006b).

[14]Details on how each covariate was measured are in SI B

E_{t-1} is the effective number of co-partisans in $t-1$ (the previous election).[15] Higher values indicate higher intra-party competition.

Study 1: Results

Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows the main results. As theorized, *Co-partisan Endorsement* decreases when candidates are more ideologically distant from their parties. One-unit change in *Ideological Incongruence* is associated with a decrease of 19.4 in the percentage of endorsements directed to co-partisans. Even though the change of one unit in *Ideological Incongruence* is unlikely (*Ideological Incongruence* ranges from 0.00 to 1.16), the effect is still meaningful when considered as an increase of one standard deviation in *Ideological Incongruence* ($sd = 0.24$). In such a case, a standard deviation increase in *Ideological Incongruence* is associated with a decrease of 4.67 in *Co-partisan Endorsement*. Regarding the control variables, only the coefficients for *Party Leadership* and *Membership* are statistically significant. Party leaders and long-term members dedicate a larger share of their endorsements to fellow party members.

Although the results support our argument, one may wonder whether certain parties influence the outcomes. This concern is particularly important in this analysis due to the absence of clear and strong party labels in Brazil (Bolognesi, Ribeiro, & Codato, 2022; Mainwaring, 1999), except for the Workers' Party (*Partido dos Trabalhadores, PT*), which is typically singled out as the only (relevant) programmatic party in the country (Hunter, 2010; Klašnja & Titiunik, 2017; Novaes, 2018). Consequently, the findings in panel (a) could be attributed to legislators belonging to a specific party. We utilize the jackknife estimator to evaluate this possibility and fit 23 models, omitting one party from the sample each time. Panel (b) presents the estimated coefficient for *Ideological Distance* in these models. In all models, the coefficient is negative and statistically significant, indicating that no party drives

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[15]When parties did not win any seats in $t-1$, the index is equal to zero, and when parties did not compete in the previous election, the index is equal to the average index in the district. We divide the index by 100 to improve visualization. Our results are robust when controlling for the number of co-partisans competing per seat (see SI B).

Figure 2: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections

(a) Main Results

(b) Jackknife Estimator

Note: Point estimates from a linear regression model (OLS). Panel (a) shows the results from the main model using the full sample. Panel (b) presents the coefficient and confidence intervals for *Ideological Incongruence* across 23 models where one party was excluded from the sample at a time (Jackknife Estimator). 95% and 90% confidence intervals using clustered (party) robust standard errors. Full results available in SI B.

the results.

In SI B, we also model the relationship using data solely from the Workers' Party. As mentioned, scholars regard the Workers' Party as the largest programmatic party in Brazil (Hunter, 2010; Klašnja & Titiunik, 2017; Mainwaring, 1999). Therefore, this represents the hardest case for our hypothesis testing. Our findings using data exclusively from the Workers' Party indicate the same pattern: federal-level candidates who are ideologically incongruent with the party are more likely to endorse cross-partisan candidates in state-level elections.

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Study 2: Party Reputation in European Campaigns

Although our Brazilian study provides strong support for our hypothesis, it has some limitations. For one, the analysis is limited to a single country, which restricts the generalizability of our findings. Second, the Brazilian political legacy of weak parties—except for the Workers' Party—hinders the capacity to evaluate whether ideological incongruence is a product of party strategy. To mitigate these two potential issues, we conduct a secondary analysis based on data from five European countries (Estonia, Greece, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland). To do so, we use data from the second wave of the Comparative Candidates Survey (CCS) (Lutz et al., 2018). The CCS is a multinational effort to collect data on candidates running for national legislative bodies—both lower and upper chambers. In the second wave, the CCS surveyed candidates in twenty elections across seventeen countries between 2013 and 2017. Although the CCS covered ten countries with preferential voting, we restrict the analysis to five countries (Estonia, Greece, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland) and elections for the lower or unicameral chamber. This limitation arises because some of the questions used to build the covariates were not included in certain countries' questionnaires.

We employ *Emphasis on Own Issues* as our dependent variable. *Emphasis on Own Issues* comes from the difference between the respondents' answers to the two following questions: "how strongly did you emphasize issues specific to your personal campaign in your campaign?" and "how strongly did you emphasize particular items on the party platform in your campaign?" Respondents used a five-point scale, from "not at all" to "very much." Surprisingly, given that all candidates competed in preferential voting systems, the average value indicates that candidates tend to emphasize their parties' platforms more than their own specific issues ($\hat{\mu}$ = -1.01, sd = 1.64).[16]

The explanatory variable, *Ideological Incongruence*, measures whether candidates per-

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[16]Social desirability bias may explain these scores. Given that this topic is politically relevant to candidates, they may have overemphasized their parties' platforms. Nevertheless, because social desirability bias is likely common across and within countries, it would hardly account for an estimated association between *Ideological Incongruence* and *Emphasis on Own Issues*.

ceive an ideological incongruence between themselves and their parties. We constructed this variable using two questions that assessed the candidates' perceptions of their own and their parties' ideological positions. CCS asked candidates to place their parties and themselves on a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means "Left" and 10 means "Right." We calculated *Ideological Incongruence* by taking the absolute difference between these two quantities. On average, candidates are less than one point (0.96) distant from their parties ($sd = 1.00$). The largest observed difference (7 points) occurs only once. Moreover, of the 3,929 candidates in the sample, 1,484 (37.7%) placed their parties and themselves in the exact location.[17]

We test our argument that *Ideological Incongruence* increases the emphasis on *Emphasis on Own Issues* using a linear model with fixed effects by party-district-election—most of the party-district-election clusters have at least two observations, with 610 out of 772 clusters fulfilling this criterion. Since party-district-election fixed effects account for factors that are constant for candidates from the same party competing in the same district, they eliminate the need to control for intraparty competition. In addition to the fixed effects and the main explanatory variable, as in our first analysis, we control for candidates' characteristics: *Party Leadership*, *Membership*, and *Political Experience*.[18]

In addition to this analysis, we leverage the diversity of parties in the sample to assess whether party type determines *Ideological Incongruence*. Our sample comprises candidates from 23 parties, resulting in a heterogeneous pool of parties with varying institutional strengths and interests. To conduct this analysis, we incorporate data from the V-Party dataset (Lindberg et al., 2022). The V-Party dataset is an expert survey of parties' characteristics. To analyze the importance of the party type, we collect information on *Economic Left-Right*, *Party Personalization* (whether the party serves the personal will and priorities

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[17]Again, social desirability bias may account for this significant overlap. Although we have no reason to believe that such a bias systematically explains the relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables, we conduct a sensitivity analysis to assess the robustness of our findings. See details in the next subsection. Furthermore, note that differential item functioning is a common issue in analyses that leverage survey data. Because we are interested in the individual's *perceived* ideological distance from their parties and not in estimating the ideological difference between candidates, we have fewer reasons to believe that this is an issue in our analysis.

[18]Details on how each of the covariates was measured are in SI C.

of one individual leader), *Internal Cohesion* (whether party elites disagree on party strategies), *Clientelism* (whether the party and its candidates provide clientelistic goods to gain votes), and *Candidate Nomination* (whether leaders or voters select candidates with high values representing more control over nominations to voters). Because all candidates from the same party in the same election share the same values for these five variables, we estimate the relationship between *Ideological Incongruence* and party type using a multi-level model in which we include a random intercept by party-year.[19]

Study 2: Results

Panel (a) of Figure 3 presents the main finding for the relationship between *Ideological Incongruence* and *Emphasis on Own Issues*. The estimated coefficient for *Ideological Incongruence* is positive and statistically significant, indicating that ideological distance is associated with opting for a less party-centered campaign. As candidates view themselves as being in a different ideological position from their parties, they seek to emphasize issues that are specific to their campaigns relative to those who share an ideological position with their parties. More precisely, an increase of one point in *Ideological Incongruence* is associated with a decrease of 0.094 in *Emphasis on Own Issues*. This value represents 5.7% of the standard deviation and, roughly, 9% of the average value of *Emphasis on Own Issues*. The results also show that, among the control variables, only the coefficient for *Membership* is statistically significant. Candidates with a long history of party membership are more likely to emphasize their party platforms when campaigning.

Table 1 displays the results for models that assess whether our findings are a by-product of party type. We are interested in evaluating whether certain kinds of parties are more likely to recruit ideologically incongruent candidates. Because V-Party, the source for our variables used to measure different types of parties, does not include all parties in CCS, we

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[19]V-Party uses a Bayesian Item Response Theory (IRT) method to combine experts' answers, allowing a cross-national comparison. Due to the IRT model, variables assume non-integer values and typically range from -5 to 5. See Pemstein et al. (2020) for a complete explanation on how the IRT method is employed.

Figure 3: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Campaign Strategies—Cross-National Analysis

Note: Point estimates from a linear regression model (OLS). 95% and 90% confidence intervals using clustered (party-district-year) robust standard errors. Full results available in SI C

also estimate a model to verify whether our results are robust to this smaller sample (we lose 1,220 observations). In column (1), we observe that our main findings are robust to the use of a smaller sample size. In fact, the estimated coefficient for *Ideological Incongruence* is statistically significant and, actually, larger in magnitude than the one estimated in using our main sample. In column (2), we replicate the analysis using a multi-level model in which we include a random intercept by party-year and control for the party type variables. Once more, our results indicate that when *Ideological Incogruence* increases, candidates put more emphasis on their own issues during their campaigns. Furthermore, none of the five coefficients for the variables used to measure party type attain conventional levels of significance. Lastly, in column (3), we report a model in which *Ideological Incongruence* is the dependent variable and the party type variables are used as explanatory variables. The findings indicate that none of the five variables has a statistically significant association with

Ideological Incongruence. In conclusion, our findings do not appear to be a byproduct of party strategies.

Table 1: Association between Ideological Incongruence, Campaign Strategy, and Party Type, Cross-National Analysis

	Emphasis on Own Issues		Ideological Incongruence
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ideological Incongruence	0.121*** (0.031)	0.122*** (0.029)	–
Party Leadership	0.022 (0.079)	0.045 (0.072)	–
Membership (in Years)	−0.007* (0.003)	−0.003 (0.003)	–
Political Experience	−0.003 (0.049)	−0.106** (0.043)	–
Economic Left-Right	–	0.116 (0.102)	0.005 (0.026)
Internal Cohesion	–	−0.144 (0.244)	−0.111 (0.070)
Party Personalization	–	0.006 (0.138)	−0.004 (0.035)
Clientelism	–	0.577 (0.441)	0.052 (0.128)
Candidate Nomination	–	0.067 (0.289)	−0.062 (0.089)
Constant	–	−0.295 (0.708)	1.004*** (0.213)
Fixed Effects by Party-District-Year	Yes	No	No
Random Intercept by Party-Year	No	Yes	Yes
N	2,684	2,684	2,684
R^2	0.376	–	–
AIC	–	9,902.455	7,656.963
BIC	–	9,973.195	7,704.123

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered (party-district-year) robust standard errors in parentheses for model 1, and standard errors in parentheses for models 2 and 3. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Lastly, before moving to the conclusion, it is worth addressing the main limitation of our cross-national analysis. As explained, all variables in this section derive from the Comparative Candidates Survey. Though this is a rich data source, using the same survey to measure both independent and dependent variables may lead to endogeneity issues. Indeed, an omitted variable may explain *Ideological Distance*, *Party Reputation*, and their association. Although we do not argue that we can causally identify the effect of ideological incongruence, given our reliance on observational data and our research design, in SI C, we confront this possibility by conducting a sensitivity analysis. Our findings indicate that omitted confounders would need to explain at least 3% of the residual variance of both *Ideological Distance* and *Emphasis on Own Issues* to bring the lower bound of the 95% confidence

interval to zero. Using *Membership* as a benchmark, the variable that explains the variance of *Emphasis on Own Issues* the most, we demonstrate that even if a confounder were five times stronger than *Membership*, we would still detect a positive and statistically significant association between *Ideological Distance* and *Party Reputation*.

Conclusion

Politicians act strategically in deciding how to operate their campaigns. They are more likely to pursue candidate-centered campaigns when personal voting-seeking incentives are high (Carey & Shugart, 1995; Crisp et al., 2025; Renwick, 2016). However, incentives from electoral rules cannot explain the variation in the behavior of candidates from the *same* party competing in the *same* election. We posited that the idiosyncratic characteristics of the candidates explain some of this heterogeneity. In this paper, we focused on the role of politicians' ideology. More precisely, we analyzed the relevance of ideological congruence between candidates and their parties. We theorized that candidates ideologically incongruent are less likely to act as party agents during campaigns. We showed that these mavericks are less likely to endorse candidates of the same party and to emphasize their parties' platforms.

We assessed our theoretical argument through two studies that relied on different types of cases and data. First, we analyzed the endorsements of candidates in Brazilian legislative elections. We found that ideologically incongruent incumbent candidates for the federal legislature are more likely to endorse candidates for state legislatures from other parties. The results are robust to the exclusion of parties from the sample and also to the analysis of a subsample of candidates from the Workers' Party, which is usually considered the most programmatic party in Brazil (Hunter, 2010; Klašnja & Titiunik, 2017). We also performed a cross-national examination using CCS data for five European countries (Lutz et al., 2018). The results of this second study also suggested that ideological incongruence is associated with a greater emphasis on candidates' own issues during their campaigns. Furthermore, we

demonstrated that ideological incongruence is not a product of party type, mitigating the threat that our findings were a mere by-product of different recruitment strategies.

This research expands our knowledge of electoral campaigns. This study provides an explanation for the variation in the personalism campaign *within* the same set of electoral institutions. By doing so, we contribute to the literature that emphasizes politicians' characteristics as essential factors in understanding their behavior in office and during campaigns, such as birthplace (e.g. Carozzi & Repetto, 2016; Nemoto & Shugart, 2013) and family ties (e.g. Muraoka, 2018). Moreover, by utilizing original social media data to measure a legislative campaign behavior, we contribute to a growing body of literature on campaigns that aims to observe campaign behavior directly, leveraging different various data sources, such as candidates' manifestos, campaign posters, among others (e.g., Catalinac, 2016; Crisp et al., 2021; Fox, 2018).

Future studies should further investigate the relationship between ideological incongruence and campaigns. Although we found that party type does not determine ideological incongruence, we did not evaluate whether certain types of parties benefit more from having a more ideological diverse candidate slate. For example, voters may be more likely to punish highly ideological (i.e., radical) parties than catch-all parties that nominate a larger number of candidates who are incongruent with their platform. Second, one could evaluate whether, once in office, parties are more likely to provide rewards to those (elected) candidates who behave as party agents during the election. Conversely, there is room for studying the behavior of ideologically congruent candidates. As demonstrated, aligned candidates lionized the party brand. However, it might be that some context, such as an economic crisis or a corruption scandal, might prompt even those candidates to pursue a personalistic campaign in an effort to save their campaign and political careers. Future research should investigate these and other possibilities.

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Supplemental Information:

Ideological Incongruence and Electoral Campaigns

A Campaign Ads

Figure A.1: Example of Campaign Material in the 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections

B Study 1: Co-partisan Endorsements in Brazil

B.1 Coding Scheme

- *Party Leadership*: 1 if the incumbent was the party leader in the lower chamber in the current or previous legislatures, or if she held a leadership position in the party commission; 0, otherwise. Source: *Câmara dos Deputados.*

- *Membership in Years*: number of years that the incumbent was a party member at the election year. Source: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.*

- *Political Experience*: number of elected offices held by the incumbent, apart from the current office. Source: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.*

- *Party is running as a PEC*: 1 if the party is running as part of a pre-electoral coalition; 0, otherwise. Source: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.*

- *Switch*: whether the federal candidate switched party during their term. Source: *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral* and *CEBRAP Legislative Data.*

- *Intraparty Competition*: $(C_t/P_{t-1}) \times (E_{t-1}/P_{t-1})$, where C_t is the number of co-partisans running in the district at t (the current election), P_{t-1} is the party magnitude using the results in $t-1$ (the previous election), and E_{t-1} is the effective number of co-partisans in $t-1$ (the previous election). When parties did not win any seats in $t-1$, the index is equal to zero. When parties did not compete in the previous election, the index is equal to the average index in the district. Source: Calculated by the authors using *Tribunal Superior Eleitoral.*

B.2 Descriptive Statistics

Table B.1: Descriptive Statistics - Brazilian Endorsements Data

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Co-partisan Endorsement	298	59.890	35.572	0.000	100.000
Ideological Incongruence	298	0.323	0.241	0.007	1.161
Party Leadership	298	0.161	0.368	0	1
Membership (in Years)	298	12.950	11.532	0	38
Political Experience	298	2.970	1.464	0	5
Party is Running as a PEC	298	0.869	0.338	0	1
Switch	298	0.171	0.377	0	1
Intraparty Competition	298	0.178	0.507	0.000	5.471

B.3 Observations Per Cluster

Figure B.2 displays the size of each cluster (party, state, and party-state) and the number of unique clusters (groups). In panels (a) and (b), we observe that only four and one clusters, respectively, are size one (only one observation). However, in panel (c), we find that most clusters are size one (more than 120 clusters only have one observation). Due to the distribution of observations per cluster, we opted to estimate our models with two-way fixed effects (party and state) instead of a single fixed effect (party-state).

Figure B.2: Number of Observations Per Cluster

(a) Party

(b) State

(c) Party-State

B.4 Full Results

Table B.2: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections - Main Results

| | Co-partisan Endorsement |
	(1)
Ideological Incongruence	-19.4*** (5.71)
Party Leadership	15.8*** (5.56)
Membership (in Years)	0.475** (0.208)
Political Experience	0.881 (1.26)
Party is Running as a PEC	1.03 (6.75)
Switch	-4.35 (7.90)
Intraparty Competition	4.54 (5.29)
Fixed-effects by Party	Yes
Fixed-effects by State	Yes
Observations	298
R^2	0.45269
Within R^2	0.10538

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B.5 Jackknife Estimator Full Models

The following five tables show the results from models in which we exclude one party from our sample each time. The excluded party is listed in the column title.

Table B.3: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections - Jackknife Estimator (Part 1)

	Co-partisan Endorsement				
Excluded Party:	PRB	PP	PDT	PT	PTB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ideological Incongruence	-18.6***	-19.0**	-19.0***	-20.2***	-17.8***
	(6.14)	(7.02)	(6.12)	(5.73)	(5.58)
Party Leadership	14.7**	16.3**	17.9***	20.3***	15.6**
	(5.54)	(6.13)	(5.82)	(6.09)	(5.67)
Membership (in Years)	0.464*	0.368*	0.472*	0.346*	0.454**
	(0.226)	(0.191)	(0.240)	(0.193)	(0.210)
Political Experience	0.329	1.11	0.248	1.35	1.15
	(1.19)	(1.31)	(1.13)	(1.46)	(1.22)
Party is Running as a PEC	-3.89	0.197	-2.24	0.073	1.44
	(5.53)	(7.14)	(6.17)	(8.95)	(6.96)
Switch	-6.03	-9.02	-3.73	-5.20	-5.95
	(8.03)	(7.75)	(8.54)	(8.09)	(8.00)
Intraparty Competition	2.07	2.92	5.74	3.93	5.00
	(4.72)	(4.94)	(5.15)	(5.85)	(4.98)
Fixed effects by Party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects by State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	284	266	286	256	294
R^2	0.47900	0.46013	0.46881	0.43615	0.46273
Within R^2	0.10600	0.10711	0.10842	0.11129	0.11108

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *$p<0.1$; **$p<0.05$; ***$p<0.01$.

Table B.4: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections - Jackknife Estimator (Part 2)

| | Co-partisan Endorsement | | | | |
| Excluded Party: | MDB | PSL | REDE | PODE | PSC |
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ideological Incongruence	-18.4***	-19.4***	-19.4***	-18.6***	-19.2***
	(5.91)	(5.71)	(5.71)	(5.83)	(5.77)
Party Leadership	13.8**	15.8***	15.8***	17.6***	16.2***
	(5.18)	(5.57)	(5.57)	(6.09)	(5.56)
Membership (in Years)	0.453	0.475**	0.475**	0.394*	0.509**
	(0.284)	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.190)	(0.210)
Political Experience	0.294	0.881	0.881	1.33	0.635
	(1.22)	(1.26)	(1.26)	(1.27)	(1.24)
Party is Running as a PEC	1.43	1.03	1.03	3.54	1.18
	(7.55)	(6.76)	(6.76)	(6.66)	(6.71)
Switch	-4.79	-4.35	-4.35	-7.04	-2.75
	(8.56)	(7.91)	(7.91)	(7.81)	(7.89)
Intraparty Competition	5.01	4.54	4.54	2.13	4.73
	(5.77)	(5.30)	(5.30)	(5.53)	(5.30)
Fixed effects by Party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects by State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	264	297	297	286	295
R^2	0.43066	0.45033	0.45033	0.45756	0.45158
Within R^2	0.08379	0.10538	0.10538	0.11925	0.10509

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model.Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.5: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections - Jackknife Estimator (Part 3)

	Co-partisan Endorsement				
Excluded Party:	PR	PPS	DEM	PHS	PSB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ideological Incongruence	-20.0**	-19.0***	-15.2***	-19.8***	-21.3***
	(7.60)	(5.91)	(5.17)	(5.68)	(5.63)
Party Leadership	15.9**	14.6**	15.7**	15.4**	16.2**
	(6.03)	(5.28)	(5.76)	(5.51)	(6.00)
Membership (in Years)	0.570***	0.491**	0.555**	0.474**	0.512**
	(0.201)	(0.213)	(0.230)	(0.209)	(0.213)
Political Experience	0.982	0.879	1.28	0.895	1.09
	(1.46)	(1.30)	(1.39)	(1.27)	(1.41)
Party is Running as a PEC	2.63	0.920	0.385	0.756	1.25
	(8.83)	(6.77)	(6.44)	(6.74)	(6.82)
Switch	-0.905	-4.28	1.26	-4.49	-2.07
	(7.72)	(8.11)	(7.12)	(7.92)	(8.09)
Intraparty Competition	5.77	4.44	2.63	3.09	4.68
	(5.30)	(5.24)	(6.37)	(5.61)	(5.70)
Fixed effects by Party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects by State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	274	292	276	296	281
R^2	0.46137	0.45356	0.47667	0.45133	0.47089
Within R^2	0.11744	0.10077	0.10057	0.10374	0.11333

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

Table B.6: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections - Jackknife Estimator (Part 4)

	Co-partisan Endorsement				
Excluded Party:	PSDB	PSOL	PATRIOTA	PSD	PC DO B
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ideological Incongruence	-22.3***	-19.1***	-19.4***	-23.3***	-20.0***
	(5.95)	(5.64)	(5.71)	(4.69)	(5.75)
Party Leadership	14.6**	16.1**	15.8***	13.8**	16.1**
	(5.60)	(5.73)	(5.57)	(5.22)	(5.78)
Membership (in Years)	0.494**	0.486**	0.475**	0.493**	0.492**
	(0.205)	(0.208)	(0.208)	(0.220)	(0.203)
Political Experience	1.01	0.915	0.881	0.781	0.957
	(1.35)	(1.25)	(1.26)	(1.37)	(1.31)
Party is Running as a PEC	3.07	1.74	1.03	1.56	0.943
	(7.14)	(6.88)	(6.76)	(7.68)	(6.74)
Switch	-5.38	-3.81	-4.35	-3.29	-4.93
	(8.20)	(8.05)	(7.91)	(8.55)	(8.06)
Intraparty Competition	5.64	8.23	4.54	6.80	4.47
	(5.39)	(5.73)	(5.30)	(5.43)	(5.37)
Fixed effects by Party	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects by State	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	271	294	297	281	291
R^2	0.46689	0.44901	0.45269	0.45481	0.44469
Within R^2	0.11556	0.10735	0.10538	0.10792	0.10712

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

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Table B.7: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections - Jackknife Estimator (Part 5)

| | Co-partisan Endorsement | | |
| Excluded Party: | AVANTE | SDD | PROS |
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Ideological Incongruence	-19.4***	-19.2***	-20.6***
	(5.71)	(5.88)	(5.94)
Party Leadership	15.8***	15.1**	15.8**
	(5.57)	(5.86)	(5.78)
Membership (in Years)	0.475**	0.485**	0.472**
	(0.208)	(0.220)	(0.206)
Political Experience	0.881	0.822	0.827
	(1.26)	(1.33)	(1.26)
Party is Running as a PEC	1.03	0.987	3.24
	(6.76)	(7.14)	(7.01)
Switch	-4.35	-4.19	-5.12
	(7.91)	(8.53)	(8.19)
Intraparty Competition	4.54	4.41	4.85
	(5.30)	(5.64)	(5.35)
Fixed effects by Party	Yes	Yes	Yes
Fixed effects by State	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	297	289	292
R^2	0.45267	0.44298	0.45424
Within R^2	0.10538	0.09911	0.10879

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B.6 Model Using Data from Workers' Party

Table B.8 shows the estimates for the model in which we use data only from the Workers' Party. The results indicate that *Ideological Incongruence* continues to reduce the percentage of endorsements to co-partisans, even among legislators from the largest programmatic party in Brazil. Note that the model does not include the variables *Party is Running as a PEC* and *Intraparty Competition* because they do not vary in the model due to the fixed effects by state (district).

Table B.8: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections - Only Workers' Party Candidates

	Co-partisan Endorsement
	(1)
Ideological Incongruence	-87.0** (37.2)
Party Leadership	1.71 (6.32)
Membership (in Years)	0.757 (0.634)
Political Experience	-1.41 (2.95)
Switch	38.5* (21.3)
Fixed effects by State	Yes
Observations	42
R^2	0.76921
Within R^2	0.37207

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Heteroskedastic robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B.7 Model Using Ideological Distance (Median)

Table B.9 shows the estimates for the model in which we calculate *Ideological Incongruence* using the value of the median legislator's coordinates as the party location. The results indicate that *Ideological Incongruence* reduces the percentage of endorsements to co-partisans.

Table B.9: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements to Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections—Replacing the Measure for Ideological Incongruence

	Co-partisan Endorsement (1)
Ideological Incongruence (Median)	-16.4*** (5.46)
Party Leadership	15.7*** (5.53)
Membership (in Years)	0.470** (0.215)
Political Experience	0.865 (1.27)
Switch	-4.21 (8.12)
Party is Running as a PEC	1.21 (6.83)
Intraparty Competition	4.62 (5.34)
Fixed effects by Party	Yes
Fixed effects by State	Yes
Observations	298
R^2	0.45058
Within R^2	0.10193

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B.8 Model Using Number of Co-Partisans per Seat

Table B.10 shows the estimates for the model in which we replace *Intraparty Competition* with *Co-Partisans Per Seat*. The estimates show that our results are robust to this alternative measure.

Table B.10: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements to Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections—Replacing the Measure for Intraparty Competition

	Co-partisan Endorsement
	(1)
Ideological Incongruence	-19.5*** (5.75)
Party Leadership	15.7*** (5.55)
Membership (in Years)	0.475** (0.188)
Political Experience	1.02 (1.28)
Switch	-4.61 (7.70)
Party is Running as a PEC	-0.975 (5.92)
Co-partisans Per Seat	-4.21 (8.26)
Fixed effects by Party	Yes
Fixed effects by State	Yes
Observations	298
R^2	0.45199
Within R^2	0.10423

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

B.9 Model Excluding Candidates who Switched Parties

Table B.11 shows the estimates for the model in which we remove candidates who switched parties during the term. The estimates show that our results are robust to removing these candidates.

Table B.11: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Endorsements of Co-Partisans, 2018 Brazilian Legislative Elections - Excluding Candidates who Switched Parties

	Co-partisan Endorsement (1)
Ideological Incongruence	-20.6** (8.41)
Party Leadership	18.4*** (6.46)
Membership (in Years)	0.598*** (0.157)
Political Experience	1.09 (1.54)
Party is Running as a PEC	8.22 (6.30)
Intraparty Competition	2.36 (5.29)
Fixed effects by Party	Yes
Fixed effects by State	Yes
Observations	247
R^2	0.43330
Within R^2	0.11388

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

C   Study 2: Party Reputation in European Campaigns

C.1   Coding Scheme

- *Party Leadership*: 1 if the candidate held a national party office, and 0 otherwise. Source: Question A6d in the Candidate Comparative Survey (Wave 2).

- *Membership in Years*: number of years that the candidate was a party member at the survey year. Source: Question A2 in the Candidate Comparative Survey (Wave 2).

- *Political Experience*: number of elected offices held by the candidate in the past (mayor, member of local parliament, of regional parliament, of European parliament). Source: Questions A6e, A6g, A6i, and A6j in the Candidate Comparative Survey (Wave 2).

C.2   Descriptive Statistics

Table C.1: Descriptive Statistics - Cross-National Analysis

Statistic	N	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Max
Emphasis on Own Issues	3,929	−1.011	1.641	−4	4
Ideological Incongruence	3,929	0.964	1.007	0	7
Party Leadership	3,929	0.251	0.434	0	1
Membership in Years	3,929	12.768	11.589	0	61
Political Experience	3,929	0.757	0.762	0	4

C.3 Full Results

Table C.2: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Campaign Strategy, Cross-National Analysis - Main Results

	Emphasis on Own Issues (1)
Ideological Incongruence	0.094*** (0.025)
Party Leadership	0.065 (0.063)
Membership (in Years)	-0.009*** (0.003)
Political Experience	-0.018 (0.041)
Fixed effects by Party-District-Year	Yes
Observations	3,929
R^2	0.40981
Within R^2	0.00935

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party-district-year) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

C.4 Sensitivity Analysis

As explained, the primary threat to our cross-national analysis is that our dependent and main explanatory variables originate from the same survey, which raises concerns about endogeneity. Although our study does not aim to capture the causal effect of ideological incongruence on campaign strategy, we agree that this issue should be addressed carefully. To do so, we conduct a sensitivity analysis in which we estimate how much confounding variables would need to explain the residual variance of the outcome and main explanatory variables to (1) explain all the estimated association $RV_{q=1}$ and (2) to bring the lower bound of the confidence interval to zero $RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$.[1]

The results in Table C.3 indicate that confounders must explain at least 6.4% and 3% of the residual variances to account for the estimated association and render it statistically insignificant, respectively. We also use the variable *Membership* as a benchmark to contextualize the sensitivity analysis results. We selected this variable because it explains the variance of *Party Reputation* the most (0.57%). Figure C.1 displays the results. We find that, even when considering a variable five times stronger than *Membership*, the estimated association remains statistically significant at $p < 0.05$.

Table C.3: Sensitivity Analysis

Outcome: *Party Reputation*

Variable:	Est.	S.E.	t-value	$R^2_{Y \sim D|\mathbf{X}}$	$RV_{q=1}$	$RV_{q=1,\alpha=0.05}$
Ideological Incongruence	0.094	0.026	3.693	0.4%	6.4%	3%

df = 3153   Bound (5x Membership): $R^2_{Y \sim Z|\mathbf{X},D} = 1.8\%$, $R^2_{D \sim Z|\mathbf{X}} = 0.4\%$

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[1] Note that we assume iid standard errors in the sensitivity analysis because of software limitations, given that as of May 16, 2025, the R package `sensemakr` did not support robust standard errors.

Figure C.1: Sensitivity contour plots of t-values

C.5   Jackknife Estimator

Table C.4 shows the results for models in which we exclude each of the countries (Jackknife Estimator). The estimates indicate that none of the countries is driving the results.

Table C.4: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Campaign Strategy, Cross-National Analysis - Jackknife Estimator

	Emphasis on Own Issues				
Excluding:	Estonia	Greece	Norway	Sweden	Switzerland
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Ideological Incongruence	0.070**	0.107***	0.096***	0.093***	0.099***
	(0.035)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.026)
Party Leadership	0.073	0.056	0.118	-0.009	0.093
	(0.078)	(0.064)	(0.075)	(0.076)	(0.065)
Membership (in Years)	-0.008**	-0.008***	-0.008**	-0.010***	-0.009***
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Political Experience	-0.084	-0.015	0.023	-0.009	-0.013
	(0.056)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.041)
Fixed effects by Party-District-Year	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	2,459	3,647	2,688	3,205	3,717
R^2	0.37912	0.39114	0.47945	0.37387	0.40469
Within R^2	0.00901	0.01018	0.00881	0.01050	0.00999

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from linear regression models. Clustered (party-district-year) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.

C.6 Alternative Dependent Variables

Table C.5 contains the results for a model in which we replace *Emphasis on Own Issues* with *Party Reputation.* This dependent variable comes from the following question: "What was your primary aim during the campaign? Where would you place yourself on a scale from 0 to 10, where '0' means to attract as much attention as possible for me as a candidate and '10' means to attract as much as possible attention for my party." We reverted the coding so that higher values represent more personalistic campaigns. The estimates indicate that ideologically incongruent candidates are more likely to attract more attention to themselves than to their parties.

Table C.5: Association between Ideological Incongruence and Personalistic Campaign in the Campaign, Cross-National Analysis

	Personal Reputation
Ideological Incongruence	0.254*** (0.047)
Party Leadership	0.197* (0.104)
Membership (in Years)	-0.014*** (0.005)
Political Experience	0.217*** (0.073)
Fixed effects by Party-District-Year	Yes
Observations	3,904
R^2	0.37318
Within R^2	0.01560

Note: Table's entries are unstandardized regression coefficients from a linear regression model. Clustered (party-district-year) robust standard errors in parentheses. *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01.